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POWER OF BANKRUPTCY RECEIVER TO SUE
IN the case of Rivoli Drug Co. v. Lynch,1 it appeared that two drug stores
had used mutual checking accounts and the same delivery facilities, and
had represented for credit purposes that they were the same firm. A
series of transactions had taken place which involved transfers of largo
quantities of stock from one store to the other. Subsequently a petition
in bankruptcy was filed against the transferor and a receiver appointed.
Upon authorization of the bankruptcy court the receiver sought an account-
ing and appointment of a receiver for the other store, alleging that there
was danger of irreparable loss to creditors through dissipation of the
assets. Over the objection that a bankruptcy receiver has no power to
sue, the relief was granted.
By a strict construction of the Federal Bankruptcy Act the courts
have evolved a so-called majority rule whereby the bankruptcy receiver,
persistently characterized as the mere custodian of the visible property
without title thereto, i's denied the power to sue to recover debts or prop-
erty.2 The court in the instant case prefers to follow the principle, for
which there is considerable support, that the receiver may bring suit,
pending the election of a trustee, to prevent dissipation of the estato.3
In support of these latter decisions and in derogation of the conception
of the receiver as a passive custodian, it is observed that the receiver
may invoke the summary jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court,
4 which
150 F. (2d) 536 (C. C. A. 9th, 1931).
2 Boonville National Bank v. Blakey, 107 Fed. 891 (C. C. A. 7th, 1901)
(suit to avoid a preferential payment); Guaranty Title & Trust Co. v.
Pearlman, 144 Fed. 550 (W. D. Pa. 1906) (fraudulent conveyance);
Bingaman v. Commonwealth Trust Co., 1 F. (2d) 505 (M. D. Pa. 1924);
Hanna, The Receiver in Bankruptcy (1930) 3 So. CALIF. L. REV. 241, 242.
3In re Fixen, 96 Fed. 748 (S. D. Cal. 1899); McKenna v. Randlo, 5
Alaska 590 (1st Div. Juneau, 1917). In the latter case the court said,
on page 592, that it is the "height of absurdity to deny the receiver
access to the courts to enable him to perform his duties under his appoint-
ment. He may sue out an attachment, or bring an action to prevent the
statute of limitations from running, or sue at law to recover any debt
or personal property which might be lost, and certainly if the interposi-
tion of equity is necessary to enable him to prevent loss or waste of
assets, he has a right to bring suit for that purpose." See In re Dempster,
172 Fed. 353, 357 (C. C. A. 8th, 1909). Cf. In re Lebrecht, 135 Fed. 878
(W.D. Tex. 1905); West v. Empire Life Ins. Co., 242 Fed. 605, 606 (W.
-D. Wash., 1917); Ellis v. Feeney & Sheehan Building Co., 18T App. Div.
481, 485, 176 N. Y. Supp. 61, 64 (1st Dep't 1919) (where property has
been taken from the receiver, he must retake it or answer in damages for
the conversion).
4In general, whatever property the bankruptcy court would have sum-
mary jurisdiction to order surrendered later to the trustee it will have jurls-
diction to order surrendered in the meantime to the receiver. 1 REMINGTON,
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extends to all the property of the alleged bankrupt not held adversely
under a bon fide claim of right. Moreover, the contention that the re-
ceiver's powers are confined to the present visible corpzs is met by the
fact that the filing of a petition in bankruptcy is a cavcat to all the world
and in fact an injunction and an attachment in regard to all the property
of the alleged bankrupt.0 Furthermore, to accept the bald statement that
the receiver shall never be entitled to sue is to overlook the provision of
the Bankruptcy Act which allows the bankruptcy court to issue orders
necessary for the protection of the estate7 Although such an order is
not conclusive that there is a cause of actions it is not subject to collateral
attack 9 and would therefore be determinative of the power to sue.
It has been urged that the receiver be given by statute a qualified title
allowing him to bring suit in all cases except those relating to fraudulent
or preferential assignments.10 One writer would even extend the receiver's
power to all cases,11 despite the fact that the present Act expressly
delegates to the trustee the right to sue in the excepted situations.'2 It
is arguable that here, as in the ordinary suit, neither rule of court nor
statute provides for an emergency situation, and in fact bankruptcy courts
have relied upon their own power to allow the receiver summary process
against a fraudulent conveyancej 3 Moreover, on the hypothesis that the
framers of the Act contemplated a speedy adjudication, it might well be
BANRUPTcy (3d ed. 1923) § 452. See In re Harris, 221 U. S. 274, 280,
31 Sup. Ct. 557, 558 (1910).
- The test of jurisdiction is the possession of the res by the court, either
actual or constructive. Examples of constructive possession are: property
in the hands of the bankrupt's agent or bailee; property held by one vho
makes no claim, or merely a colorable claim. GILBERT'S COLLIm ON BA'NX-
RupTcy (2d ed. 1931) § 23 (e) 1-5. Taubel Scott-Kitzmiller Co., Inc. v.
Fox, 264 U. S. 426, 432, 44 Sup. Ct. 396, 398 (1924). Note (1925) 5
B. U. L. REv. 42; Note (1930) 5 ALA. L. J. 226. And even adverse
claimants may be dealt with summarily when they have consented to the
jurisdiction of the court. Bryan v. Bernheimer, 131 U. S. 188, 21 Sup.
Ct. 557 (1900) (marshall); cf. May v. Henderson, 268 U. S. 111, 115, 45
Sup. Ct. 456, 458 (1925).
6 See Mlueller v. Nugent, 184 U. S. 1, 14, 22 Sup. Ct. 269, 275 (1901);
Acme Harvester Co. v. Beekman-Lumber Co., 222 U. S. 300, 300, 32 Sup.
Ct. 96, 99 (1911).
7 30 STAT. 545-6 (1898), 11 U. S. C. § 11, I. 15 (1926). Not only is
the receiver a proper person to carry out orders made pursuant to this
section, but it is his duty to call to the attention of the court the necessity
of such orders. In re Gottlieb & Co., 245 Fed. 139 (D. N. J. 1917).
s See Greenliall v. Hurwitz, 80 Mise. 186, 188, 141 N. Y. Supp. 914, 915
(N. Y. City Ct. 1913).
9 Slaughter v. Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co., 125 Tenn. 292, 143 S. W.
603 (1911).
10 See Hunt, Improvement of Bankru'ptcy Administraton, (1931) 8 A.
B. Rev. 57, 59.
112 CLARK, RECEIVERS, (2d ed. 1929) § 1111.
,36 STAT. 842 (1910), 11 U. S. C. § 96 (1926) (prefercntial transfers);
32 STAT. 800 (1903), 11 U. S. C. §§ 107, 110 (1926) (fraudulent convey-
ances).
'13 In re Haupt Bros., 153 Fed. 239 (S. D. N. Y. 1907). The statement
of the court at page 240, that this was "confessedly a most drastic remedy"
calls attention to the fact that it was necessary to avoid the statute to
reach the desired result. Cf. In re Knopf, 144 Fed. 245 (D. S. C. 1906).
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argued that the designation of the trustee does not indicate an intention
to exclude any other officer of the court.14 In view of the fact that a
conveyance cannot be deemed "preferential" until adjudication, it seems
reasonable to deny the receiver's power to avoid such a transfer 5 But
there is ample reason to allow him to set aside fraudulent conveyances
which are void at all times, for the alternative of a creditor's bill$ sug-
gested by courts when faced with urgent situations,0 offers little in pre-
venting dissipation in view of the probable neglect of creditors to take
the initiative. And in the event that there is no adjudication of bank-
ruptcy, a suit of this kind would ultimately prejudice a defendant no more
than a similar bill instituted by creditors.
EFFECT OF STIPULATIONS RESTRICTING ASSIGNMENTS OF MONEY CLAIMS
IN an action' to enforce a claim for wages, which had been assigned to
the plaintiff by an employee without the employer's consent,2 the latter
relied in defense upon terms of the employment contract, known to the
assignee,3 which expressly prohibited such an assignment. Although con-
ceding that the assignment might provide grounds for the employee's
discharge, the Illinois Supreme Court refused to uphold the stipulation
against assignment on the grounds not only that there was no privity of
contract between the assignee and the employer, 4 but also that a debtor
cannot restrict the assignability of a money claim "any more than he can
forbid the sale or pledge of other chattels."
Numerically at least the weight of judicial opinion frowns upon at-
tempts to restrict the assignability of money claims. As in the principal
decision, a number of courts have concurred with the United States
'4 It can be safely asserted that it was not the intent of the framers of
the statute to give a trustee greater powers than those of the bankruptcy
court. Cf. Horner-Gaylord v. Miller & Bennett, 147 Fed. 295 (N. D. W.
Va. 1906). The receiver has the same rights against a lien as the trustee.
Clark v. Huckaby, 28 F. (2d) 154 (C. C. A. 8th, 1928), ccrtirar)i denied
278 U. S. 648, 49 Sup. Ct. 83 (1928).
I5 See Note "(1918) 5 VA. L. REv. 272. By the terms of the act a prefer-
ence is "voidable by the trustee!'
2G See Guaranty Title & Trust Co. v. Pearlman, supra note 2, at 552;
Frost v. Latham & Co., 181 Fed. 866, 868 (C. C. S. D. Ala. 1910);
cf. In re Schrom, 97 Fed. 760 (N. D. Iowa 1899).
1 State Street Furniture Company v. Armour & Company, 177 N. D.
702 (June 18, 1931-rehearing denied Oct. 9, 1931).
2 Consent of the debtor to an assignment of the debt is not a condition
precedent to suit by the assignee in Illinois. Knight v. Griffey, 161 111. 85,
43 N. E. 727 (1896).
3 Neither court nor counsel seem to have considered the possibility, that
by taking an assignment with knowledge of the terms of the employment
contract, and the employee's consequent liability to discharge for breach
thereof, the plaintiff induced a breach of the employment contract, sufficient
either to deny him recovery against the employer, or to grant the employer
a counterclaim for the amount of his damage. The analogy to the yellow
dog contract cases seems complete. Cf. Hitchman Coal & Coke Company
v. Mitchell, 245 U. S. 229, 38 Sup. Ct. 65 (1917).
'No previous cases have been found which rely on the absence of privity
of contract in this situation.
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Supreme Court s in analogizing a debt to chattels in the hands of the
creditor. Upon such reasoning an undertaking to make a promissory note
"non-transferable without the written consent of principal and endorsers,"
and a bank's regulation making drafts payable only to the original de-
positor presenting the pass-book, have been held ineffectual as against
an assignee of the note in the one casec or the pas s-book in the other.7
Decisions nullifying restrictions upon wage assignments have more fre-
quently been reached by importing mandatory implications into statutes
making money claims assignables or by construing the language of re-
strictive stipulations as too indefinite or by interpreting them as con-
templating only a complete unconditional assignment where the assign-
ment in suit was one for securityj O
On the other hand, there is respectable authority for the view that, while
the power to assign is an incident to ownership of a money claim, the
parties may nevertheless curtail that power by freely contracting with
reference to it. 1 Thus, stipulations of non-assignability have been held
valid defenses in actions by an assignee of a claim for wages,' - of time-
certificates issued to employees for wages,S or of trading-stamps issued
by a department store to its customers. 14
If it be assumed that the stipulation against assignment in employment
5 Portugese-American Bank of San Francisco v. Welles, 242 U. S. 7, 37
Sup. Ct. 3 (1916).
6 Weber v. Rosenheim, 37 IMI. App. 72 (1390) ; Herrick v. Edwards, 106
Mo. App. 633, S1 S. W. 466 (1904).
7 Bank of United States v. Public Bank of New York City, 83 Mise. 563,
151 N. Y. Supp. 26 (Sup. Ct. 1915). As to the assignability of claims
after loss under insurance policies prohibiting assignments, see cases col-
lected in (1928) 56 A. L. R. 1391.
8 Bewick Lumber Company v. Hall, 94 Ga. 539, 21 S. E. 154 (1894). But
see Larue v. Groezinger, 84 Cal. 281, 283, 24 Pac. 42, 43 (1390). See also
Note (1915) 24 YAM L. J. 590.
9 Wabash R.R. v. Smith, 134 Ill. App. 574 (1907).
10 Inter-Southern Life Insurance Company v. Humphrey, 122 Miss. 579,
84 So. 625 (1919).
"The question is equally unsettled with regard to assignments of
bilateral contracts. In construction contracts, a provision against the as-
signability of "the contract" has been construed to invalidate only an
assignment of the contractor's duties, but not of the right to moneys due.
Bank of Harlem v. City of Bayonne, 48 N. J. Eq. 246, 21 At. 478 (1891).
Contra: City of Omaha v. Standard Oil Company, 55 Neb. 337, 75 N. W.
859 (1898). In contracts for the sale of land, a vendee's assignment in
violation of a provision against the assignability of the contract without
the vendor's consent, does not excuse the vendor from performance when
the vendee's assignee tenders the entire purchase price. Johnson v. Eklund,
72 Minn. 195, 75 N. W. 14 (1898). Contra: Lockerby v. Amon, 64 Wash.
24, 116 Pac. 463 (1911).
-State v. Kent, 98 Mo. App. 281, 71 S. W. 1066 (1903) (municipal
employer).
'3 Tabler, Crudup & Company v. Sheffield Land, Iron, & Coal Company,
79 Ala. 377 (1885); Barringer v. Bes Line Construction Company, 23
Okla. 131, 99 Pac. 775 (1909).
'4 Sperry & Hutchinson Company v. Siegal, Cooper & Company, 309 Ill.
193, 140 N. E. 864 (1923). When the stipulation is waived by the debtor's
payment of the claim into court without objection, the assignee is entitled
thereto. Fortunato v. Patten, 147 N. Y. 277, 41 N. E. 572 (1893).
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contracts is designed for the benefit of the employer alone, to avoid in-
convenience in accounts or indecision as to the proper claimant, it is
questionable whether the theory of freedom of contract should control
where none in fact exists. On the other hand, it may be argued that the
stipulation is designed for the protection of the employee as well, in
order to discourage the oppressive activities of "loan-sharks" in inducing
employees to make an improvident mortgage of their future wages. Such
considerations have led in several states to the enactment of statutes which
invalidate wage assignments unless accepted by the employer and filed
with the town clerk.1 5 But the salutary effects of the Uniform Small
Loan Law in eliminating the "loan-shark" evil,10 renders the danger of
extortion from wage earners increasingly remote. In any event, where
as in the principal case, the assignee is a merchandise creditor of the
employee, the result reached by the Illinois court would seem unobjection-
able.
PRIORITIES OF MORTGAGES ON AYTER-ACQUIRED PROPERTIES IN CASE OF
MERGER
IN 1899 the Minneapolis & St. Louis Railroad mortgaged its lines under
an indenture providing for a lien upon all after-acquired property, includ-
ing subsequently purchased rolling stock. In 1912 it purchased the prop-
erty of the Iowa Central Railroad and assumed a similar mortgage executed
in 1901 upon this line. Thereafter the Iowa division comprising 503 miles
and the Minneapolis division comprising 633 miles were operated as a unit.
In 1923 the railroad went into receivership. In the years between the sale
and the receivership, approximately five million dollars of now rolling
stock had been acquired for and used indiscriminately upon the combined
divisions. Upon foreclosure of both mortgages the Iowa trustee prayed
for an equitable allocation of this rolling stock to the respective liens,
but the relief was denied. The court in Guaranty Trust Company v. Min-
neapolis & St. Louis R. R.1 held that, although the after-acquired property
clause of the Iowa mortgage survived the sale,2 the Minneapolis mortgage
was a first lien upon all the acquisitions since it had been executed prior
25 See Note (1912) 60 U. OF PA. L. REv. 504. In Massie v. Cessna, 239
Ill. 352, 88 N. E. 152 (1909), the Illinois court held a similar statute un-
constitutional as an abridgement of employees' property rights, despite the
increased possibility of extortion in that state under the rule that even a
discharge in bankruptcy does not exonerate the employee from a claim
under a prior assignment of future wages. Monarch Discount Company
v. Chesapeake Ohio Ry. Co., 285 Ill. 233, 120 N. E. 743 (1918).
10 See RYAN, USURY AND USURY LAWS (1924) 138.
152 F. (2d) 418 (C. C. A. 8th, 1931).
2 The question as to whether the lien had survived was decided on a
prior appeal. 36 F. (2d) 747 (1929). The instant appeal is from the
decree of foreclosure. For a detailed study of the general question of
survivorship of a predecessor company's after-acquired property clause,
see Foley and Pogue, After-Acquired Property Under Conflicting Corporate
Mortgage Indentures (1929) 13 MINN. L. REV. 81; Blair, The Allocation
of After-Acquired Mortgaged Property Among Rival Claimants (1926) 40
HARv. L. Rav. 222. See also Guaranty Trust Co. v. New York & Queens
County Ry., 253 N. Y. 190, 199, 170 N. E. 887, 890 (1930), noted in (1931)
44 HARv. L. REv. 472.
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in time to the assumption of the Iowa mortgage. 3 Thus while the Iowa
mortgage theoretically has a second lien, the practical effect of the decision
is to render nugatory its after-acquired property clause since it was con-
ceded that the property is insufficient to pay the Minneapolis debt.
While it is true that the maxim qui prior est tcmpore, potior cst jurc
is ordinarily decisive of the position of respective lienors, it is equally
well settled that the rule is applied only where the equities are otherwise
equal.4 In the instant case the equities in favor of the Iowa mortgage
bondholders seem to require a nicer adjustment of the problem.5 The after-
acquired property clause was designed to extend the lien to those future
replacements and additions necessitated by the obsolescence and wear of
the old, so that in the event of foreclosure the value of the road as security
would remain intact. A decision that a sale operates to deprive bond-
holders of this necessary protection denies to them the very thing for which
they contracted. A further inequitable result of the decision is to award
to the purchaser's mortgagees rolling stock both beyond their needs and
in excess of what would have been acquired solely for their own line.
The practical difficulty of a fair allocation in particular cases may be
conceded, and yet the mere intricacy of the problem should not preclude
its satisfactory disposition. Some broad considerations may be suggested.
Where the subsequent acquisitions of the successor company are in the na-
ture of structural improvements or additions to one division, such as bridges,
extra trackage or machinery, they should feed the divisional mortgage alone.0
The addition, however, may be constructed for the use of more than one
division, as in the case of a new power house or car barn. Here there
should be an allocation based upon the needs of the particular divisions, or
in the event that the property is sold, the proceeds should be distributed
according to a ratio which would take such needs into account 7 Rolling
stock purchased exclusively for one division or used for the most part
thereon should probably not be allocated. But when, as in the instant case,
there has been indiscriminate use, the property should be apportioned to
3 Where the successor has acquired the property of constituent companies
through consolidation, as distinct from merger or a sale, the question as to
the priority of the respective liens does not arise since the predeceszors'
mortgages are simultaneously assumed. For a case in which the sub-
sequent acquisitions of a consolidated company were allocated to the
respective liens of the predecessor companies, see Citizens Savings & Trust
Co. v. Cincinnati & Dayton Traction Co., 106 Ohio St. 577, 140 N. E. 320
(1922). See also Louisville Trust Co. v. Cincinnati Inclined Plane Ry.
Co., 91 Fed. 699, 703 (C. C. S. D. Ohio 1897).
4 1 PFoay, EQ. Jun. (4th ed. 1918) § 414. A common instance of
where a mortgage executed subsequent in time takes precedence is that
of a purchase money mortgage. Harris v. Youngstown Bridge Co., 90 Fed.
322 (C. C. A. 6th, 1898). See Westinghouse Electric & Manufacturing
Co. v. Brooklyn Rapid Transit Co., 276 Fed. 152, 161 (S. D. N. Y. 1921).
For a collection of cases see Douglas & Shanks, CAssS AND BLLTnnLuvs
ON BusiNEss UNTirrs, FInANCE (1931) 57, 58.
5 For a contrary view expressed on a supposititious case similar to the
instant one see Foley and Pogue, op. cit. szpra note 2, at 100.
, See Hamlin v. Jerrard, 72 Me. 62, 80 (181) ; Guaranty Trust Co. v.
New York & Queens County Ry., supra note 2, at 206. But see Mississippi
Valley Trust Co. v. Southern Trust Co., 261 Fed. 765, 767 (C. C. A. Sth,
1919).
7 See Citizens Savings & Trust Co. v. Cincinnati & Dayton Traction
Co., supra note 3, at 609.
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the respective divisions on the basis of either mileage, heaviness of traffic,
or extent of replacement needs in such a manner as to provide as nearly
as possible a balanced equipment for each.8 A further adjustment may
be necessary, however, in a'situation where the property has been acquired
chiefly through the earnings of one division, for it would be obviously
inequitable to apply mechanically any of the above standards without
taking this factor into consideration.0
EFFECT OF THE INSOLVENCY OF THE ISSUING BANK IN A LETTER OF
CREDIT TRANSACTION
THE contracts involved 1 when a buyer promises, in consideration of the
issuance of the letter of credit by a bank, to pay it a sufficient amount,
one day before maturity, to cover the drafts drawn by the seller are gen-
erally stated to be separate and distinct.2 Proceeding upon this assumption
the courts have uniformly allowed a seller who has strictly complied with
the terms of the documentary credit, to recover from the issuing bank
notwithstanding his breach of the underlying contract of sale. But that
the theory of independence is not even here fully accepted is indicated by
the fact that the measure of damages for refusal to accept the seller's
drafts is that applicable to a breach of the sales contract.L4 Two recent
cases illustrate further limitations upon any such theory of independence,
In Seltzer v. Bank of the United States S the bank sued the buyer for the
face amount of drafts accepted by it although they had been protested for
nonpayment upon presentation and had been taken up by the buyer him-
self, the bank having been closed by the state superintendent of banks.
Arguing that the buyer was liable to it on an independent contract of
reimbursement the. bank claimed that his obligation was a general asset
of the bank and that he was merely a general creditor. The court held
that the bank had no cause of action since there was a failure of consider-
ation for the reimbursement contract upon the bank's refusal to pay the
drafts. Shortly thereafter, this case was followed by the Circuit Court
8 Ibid. 616.
9 Cf. Hamlin v. Jerrard, supra note 6, at 79.
1 The typical set-up results in three contracts: that of bank and seller
upon issuance of the letter of credit; the underlying contract of sale,
and the contract here in question. See Comment (1926) 36 YALE L. J.
245, 246; McCurdy, Commercial Letters of Credit (1922) 35 HARV. L. :RoV.
539, 715; Mead, Documentarj Letters of Credit (1922) 22 CoL. L. REV. 297.
2 See American Steel Co. v. Irving National Bank, 266 Fed. 41 (C. C. A.
2d, 1920); McCurdy, op. cit. supra note 1, at 724; Comment (1926) YAm
L. J. 245, 246. But see dissent of Cardozo, C. 3., in O'Meara v. National
Park Bank of New York, 239 N. Y.-386, 146 N. E9. 636 (1925); Note
(1925) 9 MINN. L. REV. 657. Cf. LLEWELLYN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
SALES (1930) 837 note.
3O'Meara v. National Park Bank of New York, supra note 2; Note
(1925) 39 A. L. R. 755 (1925); Frey & Son v. Sherbourne, 193 App. Div.
849, 184 N. Y. Supp. 661 (1st Dep't 1920); But the bank cannot be reim-
bursed if it fails to exact strict compliance with the terms of the letter
of credit. Bank of Montreal v. Recknagel, 109 N. Y. 482, 17 N. E. 217
(1888); (1928) 38 YALE L. J. 111.
4 O'Meara v. National Park Bank of New York, supra note 2.
233 App. Div. 225, 251 N. Y. Supp. 637 (1st Dep't 1931).
6 The court found authority for this reasoning in Leslie v. Bassett, 129
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of Appeals, -when confronted by the same issue in Grcenough v. M2,zroc.
In that case the receiver for the bank had demanded that the buyer account
for goods or their proceeds held under trust receipts and the seller was
threatening action for the price of the goods upon dishonor of its drafts.
The buyer petitioned that the funds payable to the receiver be impressed
with a trust for the payment of the drafts in the hands of their holders.
In granting relief the court concluded that the bank could not complain
since it -was not entitled to recover from the buyer after repudiating pay-
ment of the drafts.
It is apparent that both courts considered the enforceability of the buyer's
obligation to be dependent upon the capacity of the bank to perform its
contract with the seller. An opposite result could be reached only by
assuming that the mere issuance by the bank of the letter of credit is
complete performance of its obligation to the buyer.1 Such an assumption
-would be contrary both to the recognized function of the bank in financing
the sale 9 and to the intention of the parties thereto.y' It would imply
that the seller accepts the bank's obligation in place of the buyer's. It
seems better to throw the risk of the bank's insolvency on the buyer, who
is more likely to escape unharmed. The bank's disability to perform be-
cause of insolvency, accompanied by the receiver's refusal to accede to the
buyer's offer to pay the amount of the drafts conditioned upon the receiver
paying the seller in full, amounts to an anticipatory breach of contract
for which the buyer should have a provable claim for damages." Although
N. Y. 523, 29 N. E. 834 (1892), which was an action on a draft given to
reimburse a bank which had accepted, but not paid, drafts drawn for goods
sold to drawer of draft in question. Important letter of credit litigation
dates from the World War. The Leslie case is the only one which has
been found that presents our precise issue; in cases where the bank has
failed to pay for reasons other than insolvency the action is generally by
seller against the bank or against the buyer. See Llewellyn's introduction
to FINKELsTEIN, LEGAL ASPECTs oF Co0mIaacIAL L'ErTEs OF Crasrr (1930).
7 C. C. A. 2d. Decided Aug. 24, 1931.
sWhether a creditor accepts the obligation of a third party given con-
temporaneously with the creation of the debt as satisfaction is a question
of intention. Bell v. Moss, 5 Whart. 189 (Pa. 1890); 3 WiLLISToN., Cox-
TRACTS (2d ed. 1926) § 1922; AxSON, CONTRACTS (Corbin's 5th ed. 1930) §
427; FINKELsTEiN, op. cit. supra note 6, at 155. The majority view is
that the presumption, in absence of proof to the contrary, is one of con-
ditional payment only, whether the obligation given is a negotiable instru-
ment or sinlple contract. Note (1926) 40 HARv. L. Rnv. 294. For the
suggestion that the relations of the parties resembles the bill of exchange,
see Comment (1926) 36 YALE L. J. 245.
9 The purpose of the letter of credit is to shift the credit strain during
transit and resale by the buyer to an agency better qualified to assume it:
a commercial bank. Llewellyn, op. cit. supra note 6, at XIX; WU,
AuERICAN COMAIERCIAL CREDITs (1922) 124, 126, 127; Comment (1925)
34 YALE L. J. 77. The bank is in no sense a purchaser of the goods; it
holds merely a security title under the trust receipt. In re James, 30 F.
(2d) 555 (C. C. A. 2d, 1929); Comment (1923) 32 YAM L. J. 602.
10 See Note (1926) 40 HARV. L. REV. 294. The use of the "acceptance"
instead of payment on sight is for the benefit of the buyer. It cannot be
presumed that the seller is willing to take the risk of the issuing bank's
insolvency. In accord with sound business practice he desires both the
obligation of the bank and buyer. See WARD, op. cit. snpra note 8, at 190.
- Central Trust Co. v. Chicago Auditorium Association, 240 U. S. 581,
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in the instant cases the buyer can show no such injury, in a transaction
calling for payment by the bank on sight the latter should be liable for the
profits the buyer would have realized on the deal. Moreover, in the case
of an acceptance by the bank, if the seller has recovered from the buyer
on the original contract of sale, the buyer at least should have his legal
costs from the bank.
ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES OF RECEIVERSHIP-JUDGMIENT FOR WRONGFUL
ATTACHMENT DEFENDED BY RECEIVER
A WIFE sued in replevin in the Wisconsin state courts 1 against a national
bank for the wrongful attachment of her property in a suit instituted by
the bank against her husband, who was subsequently adjudicated a bank-
rupt. His creditors, including the plaintiff and the bank, stipulated that
his trustee in bankruptcy should sell the attached property and then inter-
vene in the replevin suit, holding the proceeds pending the outcome. Mean-
while, the bank became insolvent and a receiver was appointed who Inter-
vened to defend it. The state court held that the attachment was illegal,
and gave judgment against the receiver.2 In Bereth v. Sparl s the Federal
Circuit Court held the Wisconsin judgment to be an administrative expense
of the receivership, thereby entitling it to priority in payment over the
general creditors.4 The theory was that the receiver, by defending in
place of the bank, ratified the tort of the bank, and became a joint tort-
feasor ab initio.
A receiver is not liable even in his representative capacity for claims
against an insolvent arising prior to his appointment, and a judgment
therefor, even though entered against him as a formal party defendant,
gains no priority over similar claims.0 It is merely conclusive evidence
of a general claim against the fund.0 However, administrative expenses of
a receivership are entitled to priority in payment, and include satisfaction
for the tortious acts of the receiver or his agents 7 committed within the
36 Sup. Ct. 412 (1916); Pennsylvania Steel Co. v. New York City Railways
Co., 198 Fed. 721 (C. C. A. 2d. 1912). See Ballantine, Ant icpatoarj
Breach and the Enforcement of Contractual Duties (1923) 22 MIan. L.
IZ v. 329, 342.
ISparks v. Kuss, 195 Wis. 378, 216 N. W. 929 (1927).
2 Sparks v. First National Bank of Crandon, 200 Wis. 647, 228 N. W.
915 (1930).
3 51 F. (2d) 441 (C. C. A. 7th, 1931).
4 See CLARX, RECEIVERS (2d ed. 1929) § 637.
5National Bank of Augusta v. Warren, 101 S. C. 453, 86 S. E. 21 (1914);
of. Bank of Bethel v. Pahquioque Bank, 81 U. S. 383 (1871); Green v.
Walkill National Bank, 7 Hun. 63 (N. Y. 1876).
c Riehle v. Margolies, 279 U. S. 218, 49 Sup. Ct. 310 (1929); Beach,
Judgment Claims in Receivershipg (1921) 30 YALE L. J. 674. Contra:
Attorney General v. Supreme Council A. L. H., 196 Mass. 151, 81 N. E.
966 (1907).
7 McNulta v. Lochridge, 141 U. S. 327, 12 Sup. Ct. 11 (1891) (receiver
held for predecessor's acts); Gray v. Grand Trunk Western Railway Co.,
156 Fed. 736 (C. C. A. 7th, 1907) (subsequent purchaser liable); Hanlon
v. Smith, 175 Fed. 192 (C. C. N. D. Iowa 1909); Bartlett v. Cicero Light,
Heat & Power Co., 177 Ill. 68, 52 N. E. 339 (1898) (corporation liable
after receivership). But see Hopkins v. Connel, 2 Tenn. Ch. 323, 325 (1875)
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scope of his duties.s Thus a receiver has been held responsible as a
representative of the estate for obtaining an injunction without cause
against the removal of property,!) or for misrepresentation at a sale of
assets.'0  Moreovei, when he continues some tortious act begun by the
corporation prior to his appointment he can be held to have ratified it so
as to become a tort-feasor thereby." But while the plaintiff in an attach-
ment suit may ratify a wrongful levy so as to be liable in tort for the
injury, 2 one who assists in defending a wrongful attachment seems to be
liable as a "joint tort-feasor" only when he is also an attaching creditor
under a subsequent writ, and when actual possession of property is thereby
withheld." The receiver in the instant case could hardly have ratified
or joined in the attachment since the possession of the property was in
the hands of the husband's trustee in bankruptcy before he intervened.
To give preference to a claim for tort against an insolvent corporation
because of purely defensive action on the part of its receiver, undertaken
in accord with his duty to test the validity of claims against the fund in his
trust, is to place a serious obstacle in the way of beneficial receivership
administration.
LIABILITY OF RECEIVER OF CORPORATION FOR STATE FANCIISE TX
IN Michigan Tru t Company v. People,' the Circuit Court of Appeals for
the sixth circuit held that the receiver of a mercantile corporation was
under no obligation to pay a tax levied by the state of Michigan against
the corporation "for the privilege of exercising its franchise and of trans-
acting its business within [the] state" during the period in which he
operated the business. Although the validity of such a tax in the case of
a public utility receivership was admitted,2 the court reasoned that where
(receiver as public agent). But cf. State of North Carolina v. Norfolk
and Southern By. Co., 152 N. C. 785, 67 S. E. 42 (1910) (corporation not
liable for receiver's misdemeanor).
8 Brazelton & Johnson v. J. I. Campbell Co., 49 Tex. Civ. App. 218, 108
S. W. 770 (1 08); Fryr v. Hazelwood Holstein Farms, 97 Wash. 78,
165 Pac. 1084 (1917). A receiver can usually be held individually on his
bond if he is not liable in his representative capacity. Cf. Gutsch v.
Mlclhargey, 69 Mich. 377, 37 N. W. 303 (1888) (replevin suit in which
the court held the receiver liable but left it to the appointing court to
decide whether the liability was not merely individual but representative
instead).
9 Cox v. Stone, 146 La. 81, 83 So. 385 (1919).
10 Coe v. Patterson, 122 App. Div. 76, 106 N. Y. Supp. 659 (4th Dep't
1907).
"Ratcliff v. Adler, 71 Ark. 269, 72 S. W. 896 (1903).
12 Cole v. Edwards, 52 Neb. 711, 72 N. W. 1045 (1897); Frick-Reid
Supply Co. v. Hunter, 47 Olda. 151, 148 Pac. 83 (1915).
13 First National Bank of Pawnee City v. Avery Planter Co., 09 Neb. '29,
95 N. W. 622 (1903); Koch v. Peters, 97 Wis. 492, 73 N. W. 25 (1897).
' U. S. Daily, Oct. 28, 1931, at 1956. The receiver was appointed in
February, 1926, and conducted the business until December, 1929, when
all mercantile assets were sold.
2 Accord: State v. Bradley, 207 Ala. 677, 93 So. 595 (1922) ; Armstrong
v. Emmerson, 300 IlI. 54, 132 N. E. 768 (1921) ; State v. Sessions, 95 Kan.
272, 147 Pac. 789 (1915) ; Harvey v. Bay State Street Railway, 234 Mass.
1932]
YALE LAW JOURNAL
the nature of the business was such that it might be engaged in "by any
other citizen, in total disregard of the corporate capacity of the former
possessor, and without any reliance whatever upon its franchises," the tax
could not be levied.
Although the Supreme Court has held that the federal act imposing an
excise "with respect to the carrying on or doing business" applies only
where the business is carried on by the corporation itselfa imposition of
state franchise taxes has been uniformly sustained when the business is
conducted by a receiver whether it be of a mercantile or public utility
nature.4 The rule is generally otherwise where the corporation has been
enjoined from transacting the business for which it was incorporated, and
a receiver has been appointed for the purpose of winding up its affairs.
But in New Jersey it seems that a tax may be laid upon the franchise
even though its exercise has been prohibited. The specious distinction
adopted in the instant case has been ignored in a number of cases involving
the operation of mercantile corporations by receivers, and in others it has
been expressly rejected.7 Nor does the theory of the receiver's status lend
support to the decision. For it is well established that, in the absence of
statute, the legal existence of a corporation, regardless of the nature of
its-business, is neither terminated nor suspended by the appointment of
a receiver,8 and where the receiver proceeds to carry on the business lie
acts as the corporation to the same extent, pro hac vice, as if the board of
directors were in charge.9
336, 125 N. E. 614 (1920); Central Trust Co. v. New York City & N. It.
Co., 110 N. Y. 250, 18 N. E. 92 (1888).
3United States v. Whitbridge, 231 U. S. 144, 34 Sup. Ct. 24 (1913),
In In re Detroit Properties Corporation, 236 N. W. 850, 852 (Mich. 1931),
the decision in the Whitbridge case was said to be "a special construction
of a special law with a special background and was not founded upon, and
did not establish, general principles applicable to other laws."
4 People'v. Hopkins, 18 F. (2d) 731 (C. C. A. 2d, 1927); Gerke Brewing
Co. v. Kuerze, 7 Ohio App. 37 (1916) ; The Guardian Savings & Trust Co.
v. The Templar Motor Co., 116 Ohio St. 95, 155 N. E. 691 (1927); eases
cited infra note 7.
5 Ohio v. Harris, 229 Fed. 892 (C. C. A. 6th, 1916) ; Johnson v. Johnson
Brothers, 108 Me. 272, 80 Atl. 741 (1911); Commonwealth v. Lancaster
Savings Bank, 123 Mass. 493 (1877); State v. Bradford Savings Bank
& Trust Co., 71 Vt. 234, 44 Atl. 349 (1899) (tax construed to be one on
doing business).
0 In re United States Car Co., 60 N. J. Eq. 514, 43 Atl. 673 (1899).
7 In re Detroit Properties Corporation, supra note 3; see Providence
Engineering Corporation v. Downey Shipbuilding Corporation, 8 F. (2d)
304, 308 (E. -D. N. Y. 1925); In re George Mather's Sons Co., 52 N. J.
Eq. 607, 610, 30 Atl. 321, 322 (1894).
8 2 CLARK, RECEIVERS (2d ed. 1929) §§ 703, 707-709. That the appoint-
ment of a receiver does not destroy the corporation is further shown by
the fact that even after the appointment the board of directors may have
the power to act in certain matters as, for example, to pass a rezolution
authorizing the bankruptcy of the corporation and to file the same. See 2
CLARK, op. cit. supr'a, §§ 708, 767.
9 See Central Trust Co. v. New York City & N. R. Co., mtpra note 2; In
re Detroit Properties Corporation, supra note 3.
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OBSOLESCENCE AND REPLACEMENT DEDUCTIONS Fom TAXmBLE INCME
IN order to meet a heavy increase in traffic and the active competition of
other lines, the Kansas City Southern Railway, in the years 1009-1912,
proceeded at great expense to eliminate certain grades by substituting
sections of new road for portions of the old, and to construct a new shop
and terminal plant, concurrently abandoning the one formerly used. The
Interstate Commerce Commission ordered the company to charge the esti-
mated cost of these replacements, less salvage, to operating expenses, and
the validity of the order was subsequently sustained by the Supreme Court.'
To avoid an undue burdening of its operating costs account for one year,
the railroad then made application for, and was granted, permission by the
Commission to allocate the charges over a fifteen year period. In making
its tax returns for 1918 and 1919 the railroad sought to take advantage of
these circumstances by claiming the aliquot amounts for each year as tax
free items, either as deductions from net income as a reasonable allowance
for obsolescence, 2 or on the unique theory that the sums were restorations
of capital assels and as such not taxable income within the Sixteenth
Amendment. The decision of the Board of Tax Appeals disallowing the
claims was affirmed on appeal.3
Although the section of the Revenue Act under which the railroad made
its claim for obsolescence does not specify the year in which the deduction
is to be made, the court's refusal to extend the scope of the statute to
permit a corporation to make a subsequent deduction for property aband-
oned in former years is well-founded. The Revenue Acts are premised
upon the adoption of annual accounting periods and are designed to secure
an accurate representation of yearly gains and losses as a basis for a tax
on yearly income.4 To indicate the true annual income, proportionate
yearly deductions for predictable obsolescence and depreciation are properly
made, inasmuch as a portion of the loss is attributable to each year in which
the property is in use.2  Similarly, if the obsolescence is not definitely
predictable or occurs suddenly, no proration of the loss over a period of
years having been possiblep the entire deduction may be made in the
single year in which the loss becomes evident.j But to permit the taxpayer
to make the deauction in years subsequent to those in which the obsolescence
accrued would be to allow him to distort his actual income by giving him
his choice as to when he will take his loss, a clear contravention of the
Kansas City Southern Ry. v. United, 231 U. S. 423, 34 Sup. Ct. 125
(1913).
2 Revenue Act of 1918, 40 STAT. 1057, c. 18, § 234 (a) (7).
3 Kansas City Southern Ry. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 52
F. (2d) 372 (C. C. A. 8th, 1931).
4 See De Loss v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 28 F. (2d) 803, 805,
(C. C. A. 2d, 1928); MONTGOMERY, INCOmE TAX PRocEDUR (1923) 85.
5 See Gambrinus Brewing Co. v. Anderson, 282 U. S. 638, 642, 643, 51
Sup. Ct. 260, 261 (1931); Burnet v. Niagara Brewing Co., 282 U. S. 648.
51 Sup. Ct. 262 (1931); Corsicana Gas & Electric Co. v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, 6 B. T. A. 565 (1927); HOLMS, FEDERAL INCOME TAX
(6th ed. 1925) § 585.
6 Appeal of Columbia Malting Co., 1 B. T. A. 999 (to entitle the taxpayer
to proportionate yearly reductions there must be substantial reasons for
believing that the property will become obsolete, and a reasonable degree
of certainty as to when that event will occur).
1 Appeal of Dilling Cotton Mills, 2 B. T. A. 127 (1925) ; HoLMES, op. cit.
supra note 5, at 590.
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basal theory of a taxable year. The Commission's order in the instant caso,
was undoubtedly valid for its own purposes,8 but to sustain the contention
of the railroad that it also constituted a conclusive determination for tax
purposes would give the Commission power, through accounting regu-
lations, to set standards for the taxing authorities subversive of those they
themselves had promulgated.
The plaintiff's alternative theory that the annual allocations wore non-
taxable as a restoration of capital disregards the rule that the test of
income is its source, not the purpose for which it is subsequently uscd.
Although the allowance of deductions for obsolescence and depreciation Is
intended to and does permit the taxpayer to build up an untaxed r'csorvo
for replacement of such capital losses,10 no authority can be found holding
these sums of themselves tax free as restorations of capital. Such a pro-
cedure would give the taxpayer a double deduction, first when the property
became obsblete, and again when he made provision for replacement.
STATUTE OF FRAUDS-PROMISES TO ANSWM FOR THE DEBT OF ANOTIER1
IN Witschard v. Brody & Sons,' the New York Court of Appeals has re-
cently held that an oral agreement by the owner of a building in process
of construction to guarantee the credit of the general contractor in con-
sideration of the resumption of deliveries by the promisee material man
was unenforcible as a promise to answer for the default of another within
the Statute of Frauds. The decision is at variance with the weight of
authority, which excludes this type of transaction from the operation of the
Statute.2  The promise of the owner has been sometimes construed to
come within the rule that a promise to pay out of the funds of the prin-
cipal debtor is not within the Statute,3 despite the absence of any specific
reference to the source of payment.L 4 It is, however, most frequently
brought within the purview of the receipt of benefit, or leading purpose
rules, which except a promise when the consideration therefor is new and
original, moving between the newly contracting parties.5 This now con-
sideration must in most jurisdictions be beneficial to the promisor rather
than merely detrimental to the promisee.6 New York, among others, has
further required that the promisor must have an "independent duty of
8 See Kansas City Southern Ry. v. United States, supra note 1, at 452,
34 Sup. Ct. at 134, 135.
- Cf. cases cited in Note (1926) 10 MINN. L. Rnv. 270. The case of
Edward v. Cuba R. R., 268 U. S. 628, 45 Sup. Ct. 614 (1925), cited by the
plaintiff in support of its theory, was properly distinguished by the court
in the instant case, at 378.
10 See United States v. Ludey, 274 U. S. 295, 300, 301, 47 Sup. Ct. 608,
610 (1927).
1257 N. Y. 97, 177 N. E. 385 (1931).
2 1 WLLISTON, CONTRACTS (2d. ed. 1920) § 481.
3 Ibid.
4 Robinson & Son Contracting Co. v. Twin City Bank, 103 Ark. 219, 146
S. W. 523 (1912); see Halstead v. Pelletreau, 101 App. Div. 125, 128, 91
N. Y. Supp. 927, 929 (2d Dep't 1905).
5 Raabe v. Squier, 148 N. Y. 81, 42 N. E. 616 (1895) ; Howell v. Harvey,
65 W. Va. 310, 64 S. E. 249, (1909) ; Note (1909) 22 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1077,
G Davis v. Patrick, 141 U. S. 479, 12 Sup. Ct. 58 (1891) ; see 1 WILLISTON,
CONTRACTS (2d. ed. 1920). § 472.'
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payment",7 a requirement -which merely assumes the result, since if the
promisor has no independent duty, his promise is necessarily to answer for
the debt of another.
The dourt in the instant case adopts a formula suggested by Professor
Williston and inquires; whether the promisor is "a surety." Under this test
the promisee is within the Statute if as between the promisor and the
original debtor the latter "ought to pay." 8 And since it is here held that
"beneficial consideration" received by the promisor did not remove the
"ought" from the principal debtor's obligation to pay, it would follow that
the receipt of benefit and leading purpose rules as heretofor applied? are
definitely abandoned. Apparently under the rule of the principal case, the
consideration necessary to take the promise out of the Statute must be
the substantial equivalent of the performance promised, ic., of the debt,
since -where the benefit received is so equivalent, the principal debtor has
no further obligation with regard to the debt.o And since the purpose of
the Statute is to require satisfactory evidence of certain contracts,' this
rule seems consistent with logic and legislative purpose. Nor is it un-
necessarily harsh, since business practice requires such contracts to be in
writing.
7 White v. Rintbul, 108 N. Y. 222 (1888).
s1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS,' (2d. ed. 1920) § 475.
9 These rules are normally exclusive of the idea that the consideration
received by the promisor should be the substantial equivalent of 'the debt,
and refer merely to a consideration equivalent to the risk that the promikor
may'be compelled to pay. See I WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (2d. ed. 1920) § 473.
- See Fullam v. Adams, 37 Vt. 391, 401 (1864).
-See The Richardson Press v. Allbright, 224 N. Y. 149T, 502, 121 N. E.
362, 364 (1918).
